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Part I: How the real estate market got stir-fried
By Michael Gsovski
Southeast of Kunming, a new city has risen from the earth, so new that it is literally called the
“Chenggong New Area.” Giant complexes of towering, modern apartment buildings line the
wide, recently built streets, broken every few kilometers by parks as large and as welldesigned as any in Kunming proper. Every block of apartment buildings has a police substation, and some have functioning schools. Along the recently constructed highways linking
the new city to the old, it seems as if farmland has been transformed into a high-rise
commuter suburb like those on the outskirts of Hong Kong and Tokyo in less than a decade.
But something is off. Traffic passes through at a languid one to two cars a minute, about one
tenth the rate of less densely built urban districts in Kunming. Unlike residential
neighborhoods in most Chinese cities, no clothing stores or noodle shops are open for
business. Instead, the vast majority of operating storefronts are either real estate offices or
furniture stores, and their keepers only report an average of one or two paying customers a
week. Most strikingly, the expected throngs of pensioners practicing tai chi and dance in the
parks are nowhere to be seen.
A closer inspection explains this eerie quiet. In almost every building, anywhere from ten to
sixty percent of the windows lack curtains or any other visible signs of habitation. Chenggong
is a fully built city that lies half-empty. It is a modern ghost town. Yet, there are practically no
“for sale” signs. The town is both fully built and fully sold.
Similar reports are coming in from all over China. In the Kangbashi neighborhood in the desert
city of Ordos, housing that observers estimate can hold between 300,000 and 1 million people
has been built and left virtually unoccupied. In the seaside resort city of Sanya, property
prices rose 50 percent from 2008 to 2009, yet nobody knows how much of the new
construction is being used. And these are only the most visible examples of a more systemic
problem. While statistics in China are notoriously unreliable, Shanghai-based economist Andy
Xie publicly estimated last year that China had a vacancy rate of 25 to 30 percent, roughly 10
times the amount he would consider normal. Beijing-based Dragonomics property analyst
Roselea Yao put the national vacancy rate at around 20 percent, the majority in high quality,
recently constructed buildings.
“The problem right now is a structural problem,” Yao said. “Specifically, you have a shortage
at the low end, but you have an oversupply at the high end.”
All this begs the question: in a rapidly growing nation where Yao believes 140 million urban
housing units are serving 200 million urban households, how can so many high-quality
apartments be built and sold, but then left unoccupied?

Welcome to Chenggong. Ample parking.

He Haojun is a lawyer for the Kunming branch of the Dacheng law firm, representing
corporations, developer, and investors. Mr. He can list every problem in the Chinese real
estate market today. The government owns all the land, and leases it out at its discretion to
earn revenue. Buyers pay more than the market value, while the people living on the land
receive less, with the surplus going to local governments. If there is a problem with the
government, the courts will be of no help because the judges owe their jobs to the same local
officials who depend on that money. Real estate companies therefore are composed mainly of
individuals well versed in negotiating with the government but with little skill and even less
interest in building housing that fulfills the needs of the average person.
Mr. He has himself invested in an apartment in Chenggong, not in spite of this government
interference, but because of it.
“The government wants to increase their revenue, so they have to make sure the price of land
increases constantly,” He said. “Under these conditions everyone must choose to invest in real
estate.”
This is the “stir-fried apartment,” a phrase that describes apartments bought by wealthy
individuals as investments, yet left empty because nobody they know is willing to pay the high
rents. Many buyers understand that the market for apartments does not conform to consumer
demand, but invest anyway, for two reasons. First, they need a place to store savings outside
either the sclerotic banking system, which delivers returns far below the rate of inflation, or
the Chinese stock market, which is notoriously volatile.
Second, they are confident that local governments will continue to drive land prices upwards
as a way to raise land lease revenues.
Since only the government can own land, all individuals or corporations seeking to build on it
have to pay fees to the authorities. In the absence of a real estate tax, these fees constitute
the sole way for local governments to make money off real estate development. According to

a report by Caixin magazine, they account for an average of 46 percent of all local
government revenues.
Patrick Chovanec, assistant professor of economics at Tsinghua University, says that these
incentives have been present since the beginning of “marketization” reforms in the housing
market over a decade ago.
That real estate prices have since increased by “5 to 10 percent a year,” in Yao’s estimation,
and never significantly decreased in this period only intensified the desire to invest. However,
now Chovanec believes it has become a “classic bubble,” with prices decoupled from actual
consumer demand.
“Unlike the stock market, which they know can go down, people see real estate as a secure
store of value, that can only go up,” Chovanec said. “They’ve only seen the upside, they
haven’t seen the downside.”
According to Chovanec, investment in real estate exploded after the global financial crisis in
2008, when the Chinese central government dictated that banks increase lending to stimulate
the economy. As a result, the Chinese money supply increased by more than 50 percent, with
the new money channeled largely into the hands of people who were already wealthy enough
to invest.
“They have all this extra cash, and real estate is where they’re stashing it,” Chovanec said.
“Now you’ve given them even more cash, and they’re going to put it in the same place, so the
prices went up accordingly.”
In Mr. He’s estimation, the fact that housing has become unaffordable for ordinary people will
not result in prices falling to meet actual demand, since the government’s policy will drive
housing prices and ordinary people simply do not matter in the government’s considerations.
“In theory, [prices should decrease], but, in fact, that will not happen,” Mr. He said. “The only
ones who hope housing prices will go down are the poor people.”
“Do you think the poor people are strong enough to fight against the landowners, the
government and real estate companies?” He asked, rhetorically.

Unavailable vacancies.

Sun Po knows the problems of the “poor people,” that Mr. He is talking about all too well. As
vice director of the Yunnan Women Migrant Educational Research Professional Association,
based in the low-income Dashuying neighborhood in East Kunming, he has years of experience
working with them. An indication of his leanings comes when he is asked about the importance
of “nail-house” incidents, when property owners stay on their land to protest what they
believe to be insufficient government compensation for the value of their buildings. While
these protests are consistently well-covered in both domestic and foreign media, in Sun’s view
at least, the people getting their houses torn down are the lucky ones.
“The tearing down of the houses will benefit the owners a lot,” Sun said. “It makes them rich.
If they think the compensation is high enough, they will move.”
Instead, according to Sun, the people that bear the brunt of these demolitions are those who
would otherwise rent out the old, cheap buildings being demolished, the people living in places
like Dashuying.
“There are many old neighborhoods in the city that the mayor thinks block development,” Sun
said. “So these houses are being torn down. People have nowhere to live, they come to the
places where the houses haven’t been torn down, therefore the prices increase.”
Sun has felt the effects first-hand. The rent for the office where he works jumped from 450
RMB in 2007 to 850 RMB in 2010, a rise that far outstrips China’s official inflation rate of
approximately 8.1 percent during the same period as taken from OECD statistics.
The macroeconomics agree with Sun Po’s experience. Roselea Yao estimates that urban rents
have risen nationwide approximately “twenty to thirty percent” over the past three years. And
Chovanec believes that the rent situation is primarily hurting new arrivals to the market, be
they migrant workers, senior citizens, or young professionals.

“If you don’t have a place, there isn’t a product for you,” Chovanec said. “You have a choice of
paying for something that actually doesn’t suit you or is far away enough that it’s actually
affordable.”
A case study of this phenomenon would be Yu Huixiang and her family. As migrant workers
from Songming county in Yunnan, they have always had to rent. Her family—consisting of
herself, her husband, her son and her husband’s mother—rents two rooms that sit at street
level in the corner of a Dashuying alley.
Their monthly rent increased 40 percent last year, from 250 RMB to 350 RMB, out of a salary
of 2000 RMB made largely from Yu Huixiang’s work embroidering shoe soles.
Her response has been simple. She can’t earn more and she can’t find cheaper housing, so
she now spends less on everything but her son’s education.
“The only way is to buy cheap things,” Yu said. “If things are not necessary, I will not buy
them. Now that many neighborhoods have been torn down, houses are in short supply.”
When asked why houses were in short supply, Yu answered—without any trace of irony—that
the government was building new housing.
“But we don’t have enough money. We can’t afford it,” she said. “Almost all of the new
housing is empty, because most people can’t afford it.”
In Yao’s view, unless the government intervenes, sixty million migrant workers like Yu will be
forced to continue paying higher and higher rents for substandard housing.
“Their housing needs will not be solved by the profit driven developers,” Yao said. “The
government was basically blind to this problem and pushed it away for a decade, but right
now they have to solve that problem. They have to do something.”
Whether they will remains to be seen.

Yu and her husband, waiting.

Read Part II of this post here.
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